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Those of us who study current international affairs need periodic remind-
ers of the limits of our assessments. Fortunately, we can usually count on the 
month of August to provide this service, and this year was no exception. No 
sooner had the US-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty been signed in 
Moscow than Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was ousted in a military 
coup, an event that many Soviet studies experts had avowed never would 
happen. But the coup failed (for some, another surprise), and Gorbachev 
returned to office — only to preside over the apparent rapid disintegration of the 
Union, and to see the party that had dominated Soviet life for 74 years being 
consigned to "the dustbin of history." The only thing we may be certain of (as 
this goes to press) is that the last act in this drama has yet to be played out. 
The events in Moscow this August have implications that relate to at least 
two of the articles in this issue. Scot Saltstone examines the problems Canada 
has experienced for lack of a clear definition of national security in its laws. In 
the absence of a "Soviet threat" or even a Soviet Union itself, the problem of 
defining national security, and what constitutes challenges to it, probably will 
become even more difficult. Glenn Hastedt's article explores the possibilities 
and limits of comparative studies of intelligence services. He points to limits on 
data as one constraining factor, although not a prohibitive one. The changes to 
die KGB that seem likely to flow from the changes in the Soviet Union as a whole 
may add a new dimension to comparative studies of intelligence, if more data 
on die activities of the KGB and its predecessors is released. 
While attention has been focussed on Moscow, it is worth recalling that 
various forms of low intensity conflict continue elsewhere, in Yugoslavia, for 
example, and in Northern Ireland. With respect to the latter, Michael McKinley 
examines the international contacts of the Provisional IRA and concludes that 
its indigenous political/cultural roots have proved a much stronger influence 
than mat of any external or foreign group. Even the Marxist views of Sinn Fein 
leader Gerry Adams have had to be presented in a traditional framework that will 
appeal to the Catholic nationalist political culture. Clearly, if die Soviet Union 
had any influence in this conflict -- and McKinley suggests it was minimal -- the 
events of August 1991 seem likely to remove it from me equation altogether. 
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